Making it easier for companies to change prices quickly actually prevents them from colluding to overcharge customers.
March 31, 2026
Original Paper
Interaction Frequency and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games 
SSRN · 6425019
The Takeaway
Standard economic theory suggests that high-speed pricing helps monopolies because they can instantly punish any member who tries to lower prices. This experiment finds the opposite: high-speed interaction triggers chaotic cycles of price-cutting that actually break down collusion and result in lower profits for firms and better deals for consumers.
From the abstract
Increasing the frequency at which firms interact in an oligopolistic market strengthens collusion incentives. When other firms can react more quickly, the incentive to undercut competitors' collusive prices is reduced. We experimentally test whether increased interaction frequency results in higher average profits, in line with the corresponding impact on collusion incentives. Surprisingly, we find that higher interaction frequency decreases collusion levels. We show that this effect is solely d