We keep picking negotiators who fail because we instinctively want someone who is just as biased as we are.
April 2, 2026
Original Paper
Agent Selection and Belief Polarization in Distributive Bargaining
SSRN · 6409319
The Takeaway
While you would expect principals to hire professional 'agents' who can find common ground, experiments show they actually select agents who share their own skewed view of what is 'fair.' This results in two sides sending their most extreme representatives to the table, significantly increasing the chances of an expensive impasse compared to if they had negotiated for themselves.
From the abstract
Many negotiations-from legal disputes to labor contracts-are conducted through agents rather than directly by principals. While significant attention has been given to the misalignment of interests between principals and agents, little is known about how the process of selecting an agent affects bargaining outcomes. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 4,385), we show that principals systematically choose agents who go on to make overly aggressive offers. Principals on each side preferenti