Sanctions against dictators usually fail because the elites are too terrified of 'loyalist' spies to realize they all want to overthrow the boss.
March 25, 2026
Original Paper
The Information Problem Limiting the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions on Autocratic Regimes
SSRN · 6400925
The Takeaway
It is usually assumed that if sanctions hurt a dictator's inner circle enough, they will eventually team up to force a change. This study shows that because elites cannot communicate without risking a death sentence from a potential snitch, they remain 'rationally' silent even when 100% of them secretly wish the sanctions to end.
From the abstract
While advances in targeted sanctions policy have enabled senders to apply greater and greater levels of targeted economic pressure, sanctions rarely prompt elites to pressure their leader into compliance. Extant literature has argued that by providing compensation for losses caused by sanctions, targeted leaders can retain the loyalty of elites. However, in this paper, I argue that the structure of elite interactions in the target state creates an information barrier to sanctions effectiveness.