We can solve the 'Buyer's Paradox' by forcing AI agents to intentionally forget what they've seen.
April 14, 2026
Original Paper
Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets
arXiv · 2604.08606
The Takeaway
It uses recursive information markets where LLMs act as buyers who can 'forget' inspected data to maintain information value. This uses AI's unique ability to be selectively 'wiped' to solve a classic hurdle in information economics.
From the abstract
One of the impediments to the efficiency of information markets is the inherent information asymmetry present in them, exacerbated by the "buyer's inspection paradox" (the buyer cannot mitigate the asymmetry by "inspecting" the information, because in doing so the buyer obtains the information without paying for it). Previous work has suggested that using Large Language Model (LLM) buyers to inspect and purchase information could overcome this information asymmetry, as an LLM buyer can simply "f