Defendants who are threatened with the harshest possible sentences actually become more confident they will win at trial.
Overcharged defendants reject plea deals more often because extreme legal threats trigger a counterintuitive psychological backfire. Prosecutors typically assume that piling on charges will scare a person into admitting guilt quickly. Legal records from plea negotiations show that these massive threats actually make people overestimate their chances of being acquitted. When the stakes become too high, the human brain pivots toward an irrational level of optimism to cope with the stress. This means that aggressive charging strategies often lead to more trials and a more congested court system rather than more confessions.
When Threats Backfire: Overcharged Defendants Overestimate Their Trial Prospects and Reject Plea Offers More Often
PsyArXiv · bpxcj_v2
Objective(s): Strategic overcharging involves threatening disproportionately harsh punishment to widen the differential between the potential sentence if convicted at trial (PTS) and the plea sentence. Though larger discounts increase plea acceptance, excessive PTSs can counterintuitively reduce acceptances when holding discount constant. Drawing on anchoring theories, I investigated whether PTSs anchor defendants’ sentencing preferences, alter case appraisals, and influence plea decisions. Hyp