Malicious computer code can now be hidden inside synthetic DNA and triggered when a scientist sequences the sample.
This theoretical framework shows how to encode software exploits into biological material to hack bioinformatics systems. A physical tube of DNA acts like a malicious USB drive that triggers a buffer overflow when the sequencing software reads the genetic data. This discovery reveals a terrifying new attack vector where the digital and biological worlds collide. Traditional cybersecurity does not look for viruses in actual physical test tubes, creating a massive blind spot. Security protocols in medical and research labs will need a total overhaul to protect against biological malware.
The Silicon-Carbon Interface: Decoding DNA-Based Cyber Attacks
SSRN · 6651578
This paper addresses an emerging security threat at the intersection of synthetic biology and cybersecurity, known as the "silicon-carbon interface." Here we present an analytical framework for assessing attack feasibility if the target is a biological medium subject to cyberattacks using DNA. With the accelerating digitization of genetic data, structural vulnerabilities have emerged in bioinformatics pipelines, making them susceptible to unconventional cyberattacks. The research presents an inn